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XVI
The Development of International Law
with Respect to the Law Enforcement
Roles of Navies
and Coast Guards in Peacetime

Ivan Shearer

IfNTERNATIONAL LAW HAS, at least since the time of Grotius, recognized

Jlthe right of States to regulate the seas adjacent to their coasts and to
enforce their laws against foreign vessels. The rights of regulation and
enforcement included principally the subjects of customs, fisheries, health and
immigration. Until the twentieth century, coastal States were primarily
concerned with the protection of their territory, including their neutrality in
cases of war between other States. In the present century, additional concerns
have arisen: the conservation and management of the diminishing living
resources of the sea and seabed, the exploration and exploitation of the
nonliving resources of the seabed, and the protection and preservation of the
marine and coastal environment.
The modem international law of the sea, reflected in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, allows States to assert and exercise a
multitude of sovereign rights and jurisdictions in zones beyond the territorial
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sea. The Convention is comprehensive and detailed in these respects. In
respect of the manner of enforcement of these sovereign rights and
jurisdictions, however, the Convention is for the most part silent. Resort must
be had to principles and rules of customary international law in assessing the
rights and responsibilities of States in the enforcement of their powers and
rights under the Convention.
In the exercise of those powers of regulation that cannot, or cannot always,
be carried out by authorities on land, States have used a variety of vessels and
officials. Some States deploy their navies and air forces in this role,
supplementing them where necessary with vessels and officials operated and
staffed by such agencies as customs, environment, fisheries, health, and
immigration departments. Other States have a designated coast guard service,
which carries out all law enforcement activities at sea in peacetime.
Where navies are used in peacetime law enforcement roles, it is obvious that
much of the training directed towards their primary task is also relevant to the
task of policing maritime zones. In particular, the principle of graduated force l
has application in the exercise of the right of approach, stopping, boarding,
searching and seizing foreign merchant vessels. Rules of engagement and
special procedures are regularly rehearsed and exercised. Where a coast guard
or other'govermental enforcement agency is employed in these roles, it too will,
or should, be guided by the same principles and rules. Moreover, in time of
armed conflict these maritime forces are likely to be integrated into the war
, effort, and their crews must be capable of swift adaptation to traditional naval
of experience between roles, and between the
roles. The
forces employed in those roles, ought to be consciously encouraged in times of
peace.
The modem international law of the sea, with its concession of expansive
zones of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, together with its concerns for
access to natural resources, navigational freedoms, and the protection of the
natural environment, presents many possibilities for dispute between States.
Unlawful, unjustifiabty forceful, or clumsy law enforcement can be the
occasion not only of disputes but even of armed conflict.
States take up their rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction in their maritime
zones and exercise them in accordance with their domestic laws. These laws
mayor may not be, in accordance with international law. In some cases,
domestic laws with respect to enforcement may date back to earlier times and
may be inconsistent with modem international law, or, being administered by
different departments, lack congruity with other domestic laws.
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A distinction is commonly observed in the assertion and exercise of
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in national maritime zones and on the high
seas between nationals and national vessels of the enforcing State, and foreign
vessels and persons. This distinction derives from two considerations. In the
first place, international law does not, in general, concern itself with matters
arising between a State and its own citizens, especially in relation to the
enforcement oflaws to which the citizen owes obedience. In the second place,
constitutional considerations may arise as to the use of the regular armed
forces, as distinct from police and other civilian governmental agencies, in the
enforcement of laws against citizens.
The Powers and Manner of Enforcement of Coastal State Rights and
Jurisdictions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 1982 (LOS Convention)
There was an evident reluctance at the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Ill) to formulate in detail prescriptions of the
manner of enforcement of the various sovereign rights and jurisdictions
accorded to coastal States by the resulting Convention. Where the
Convention incorporates the texts of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958,
the same euphemisms or evasions are repeated. In the parts of the LOS
Convention that are new, references are scattered and are not harmonious,
reflecting the division ofUNCLOS III into three main committees and various
working groups.

The Territorial Sea. Since a coastal State's full sovereignty extends to its
territorial sea, in principle it enjoys plenary powers of enforcement of its laws in
those waters. However, in view of the international community's interest in the
right of innocent passage through territorial seas, and especially in the right of
transit passage through, over, and under those parts of the territorial sea that
comprise straits used for international navigation, certain restrictions are
placed on enforcement powers.
In relation to innocent passage, there is a general restriction that a coastal
State "should not" exercise its criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign vessel to
arrest any person or conduct an investigation unless the consequences of the
crime, committed on board the foreign vessel while in passage, extend to the
coastal State; the crime affects the peace of the coastal State or the good order
of the territorial sea; assistance has been requested by the master of the vessel
or the authorities of the flag State; or such measures are necessary for the
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suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotics. It will be noted that the words used
are "should not" and are thus not an outright prohibition (LOS Convention,
art. 27 (1)). However, this mild restriction does not apply to an arrest or
investigation on board a vessel in the territorial sea after it has left the internal
waters of the coastal State. Nor does it apply in respect of offenses committed
against laws validly applying in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), where the
vessel has subsequently entered the territorial sea. The sole outright
prohibition is of arrest and investigation on board a foreign vessel in innocent
passage in respect of crimes committed on board before the vessel, proceeding
from a foreign port, entered the territorial sea. An exception is enforcement
actions taken pursuant to laws applying in the EEZ and to certain marine
pollution offenses, as allowed under Part XII of the LOS Convention.
By contrast, in relation to the exercise of civil jurisdiction by way of arrest or
levy of execution against a vessel in innocent passage, the prohibition is made
mandatory by the LOS Convention, Article 28(2), except in respect of
obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the vessel itself in the course of
or for the purpose of a voyage through the waters of the coastal State.2
It is axiomatic that in the territorial sea as elsewhere at sea and on land, the
international law doctrine of sovereign immunity forbids any interference with,
or attempt at law enforcement on board, a foreign warship or a government
vessel in noncommercial service. However, it is unclear whether vessels
exercising their rights of transit passage through straits have any degree of
immunity from being stopped and boarded (or aircraft from being diverted and
ordered to land).3 There is no express provision in the Convention allowing for
the enforcement-as distinct from the prescription-of coastal State laws.
Article 34, dealing with the legal status of waters forming straits used for
international navigation, does not entirely resolve the problem, since it is not
clear whether it means that all other provisions relating to the territorial sea
apply except insofar as they are inconsistent with a provision applying to transit
passage, or whether it is speaking merely of prescription and not of
enforcement, which is subject to the specific regime of Part
The undoubted
implication is that such powers should be exercised with restraint and only be
invoked, by analogy with Article 27, where there are significant effects on the
coastal State, or under general international law by way of self, preservation in
the face of an imminent peril. Article 38 (3) provides that "any activity which is
not an exercise of the right of transit passage through a strait remains subject to
the other applicable provisions of the Convention." This may be understood to
bring in Article 25, allowing the coastal State to take the "necessary steps" in its
territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent. The applicability of
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Article 25 is made plausible by the consideration that, before the entry into
force of the LOS Convention, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, and customary international law, regarded straits
transit passage as merely a nonsuspendable form of innocent passage. A
generally cautious approach appears to be confirmed by the LOS Convention,
Article 233, which provides for the exercise of enforcement powers specifically
in relation to pollution offenses by vessels transiting straits only where the
violation causes or threatens major damage to the marine environment of the
straits. State practice under the Convention may clarify the matter in future.
State practice before the Convention came into effect would support the
existence of a general power to enforce laws against vessels transiting straits, at
least where the offenses are serious.5
Nothing is said in the Convention generally about the manner of
enforcement by the coastal State of its laws in the territorial sea. In relation to
vessels in innocent passage, it provides that "the coastal State may take the
necessary steps in the territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent."
The expression "necessary steps" derives from the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Article 16(1), and broadly
encompasses the standard procedures of approach, stopping, boarding,
investigation, and possible arrest. The word "prevent," however, if it stood
alone and had no earlier history, might suggest that a coastal State had the
power only to prevent non, innocent passage by, not arrest and punish, the
foreign vessel. But such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the
presumption of full residual sovereign powers in the territorial sea. It would also
be contrary to the clear implications of Articles 27 (5) and 220(2) of the LOS
Convention, the latter provision relating to the enforcement of pollution laws
in the territorial sea, including in relation to vessels in innocent passage. The
power to "prevent" merely offers the coastal State, in this context, a more
agreeable alternative to arrest and prosecution of an offending vessel, that is, by
barring its access or diverting it away from the territorial sea. 6

Archipelagic Waters. Although the theory on which claims to archipelagic
waters were made, beginning with Indonesia in the 1950s, would necessarily
regard them as internal waters and thus even more firmly under exclusive
coastal State sovereignty than territorial waters, the development and
acceptance of the concept during UNCLOS III resulted in a substantial
equating of archipelagic waters with territorial waters, and archipelagic sea
lanes passage with transit passage through and over international straits. The
wording of LOS Convention Article 49 on the legal status of archipelagic
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waters is substantially identical with that of Articles 2 and 34. There is a right of
innocent passage through archipelagic waters not included in archipelagic sea
lanes, and the regime expressly incorporates by reference the whole of Part II,
Section 3, of the Convention on innocent passage in the territorial sea (LOS
Convention, art. 52(1». Similarly, the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage
and overflight applies Articles 39,40,42 and 44 on transit passage through and
over straits mutatis mutandis (LOS Convention, Art. 54). Whatever fine points
of distinction between archipelagic sea lanes passage and straits transit passage
there may be argued to exist, 7 from the point of view of law enforcement the
legal environment of archipelagic waters is not substantially different from that
of the territorial sea.

The Contiguous Zone. The contiguous zone, under the LOS Convention, may
extend to a maximum breadth of twenty,four nautical miles from land or from
territorial,sea baselines. It occupies the sea area lying between that limit and
the outer limit of the territorial sea. In relation to the four kinds of laws
applying to its land territory or its territorial sea, in which prevention or
enforcement activities may be carried out in its contiguous zone (customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws), the coastal State "may exercise the
control necessary to" prevent infringement of those laws by inbound vessels or
to punish infringements committed by vessels in its territory or territorial sea
when they are outward bound in the contiguous zone (LOS Convention, art.
33).
The phrase "may exercise the control necessary to" in Article 33 should be
compared with the phrase "may take the necessary steps" in Article 25(1),
applying to the territorial sea, discussed above. Is there a practical difference? It
must be remembered that the contiguous zone is not a zone of coastal State
sovereignty or even of coastal State jurisdiction; it is a police zone.8 Its residual
status, even taking into account that it is included in the exclusive economic
zone, is that of high seas. As a consequence, the rights exercisable by the
coastal State in its contiguous zone are of a distinct character and are to be
accorded differently depending on whether the action taken is preventive or
punitive. In the former case (inbound vessels), it is arguable that arrest is
precluded, since by definition no offense has yet been committed. In the latter
case (outbound vessels) an offense has been committed and may be dealt v.ith
accordingly; this requires no more qualification of coastal State powers than of
hot pursuit, except that the pursuit need not have begun in the territorial seaY
The right to arrest inbound vessels in the contiguous zone in respect of
apprehended immigration offenses was left open by the Privy Council in 1948
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by reason of the fact that the vessel concerned was statelessjlO the right to arrest
may still be in doubt, but it might be cured by the enactment by a coastal State
of a law applicable in its contiguous zone prohibiting navigation with the
intention of breaching coastal State laws in its territorial sea or territory.ll

The Exclusive Economic Zone. As might be expected from the limitation of a
coastal State's legislative powers over its EEZ, and the high value placed on the
freedoms of navigation enjoyed by other States in the zone (subject only to the
rights and jurisdiction given the coastal State in relation to the natural
resources of the zone and structures connected therewith), the specification of
enforcement powers is expressed by the LOS Convention in notably
circumscribed terms. Indeed, the very fact that enforcement powers are spelled
out in Part V of the Convention, dealing with the regime of the EEZ, whereas
they are merely assumed or implied in relation to the territorial sea,
archipelagic waters, and the contiguous zone, indicates that they are regarded
as more sensitive matters and are to be construed strictly.
A general limitation on enforcement of rights, imposed by Article 56(2) of
the LOS Convention, is that "in exercising its rights and performing its duties
under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a
manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention." This general
limitation applies in respect of all the resources of the EEZ, not merely the living
resources.
The specific powers of enforcement given to States in their EEZs by the
Convention is, however, only in relation to the free,swimming living resources
of the zone. LOS Convention, Article 73 provides:
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic
zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial
proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance With the laws and
regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be prompdy released upon the
posting of reasonable bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in
the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of
agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of
corporal punishment.

435

Law Enforcement Roles of Navies and Coast Guards
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall
promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken
and of any penalties subsequently imposed.

It is to be noted that Article 73 does not apply to the nonliving natural
resources, such as gas, oil, and minerals, nor to the living sedentary species of
the zone, which are regarded as belonging to the regime of the continental
shelfP Because the sovereign rights of the coastal State over nonliving and
sedentary resources of the EEZ (and of the continental shelf, where that shelf
extends beyond the outer limit of the EEZ) are stated to be exclusive,!3 it was
thought unnecessary at UNCLOS III to give to coastal States express power to
enforce those rights. The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of
1958 is similarly silent; the power to enforce is implicit.
The reason why the power and manner of enforcement by coastal States of
their rights in the water column of their EEZs should be stated explicitly,
whereas in other zones of national maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction those
powers are implicit, is that the EEZ is governed by an artificially created
regime 14 that required the striking of a delicate balance between coastal State
interests in conserving and managing living natural resources and the interests
of other States in the traditional freedoms of navigation. To underline this
point, the LOS Convention provides that in relation to disputes concerning the
release of arrested vessels, compulsory jurisdiction is given to the courts and
tribunals specified in Article 287, or, failing agreement on another court or
tribunal, to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (LOS
Convention, Art. 292) .15
Separate consideration will be given below to the special position with
regard to the enforcement of pollution laws in the EEZ.

The High Seas. The high seas, being regarded from the time of Grotius onward
as either res nullius or res communis and incapable of appropriation by any State,
are an area in which in principle there is no right by any State to interfere with
the free navigation of vessels and aircraft. The exceptions are set out in Article
110 of the LOS Convention:
• Vessels of the same nationality as the intercepting warship or aircraft.
The exception also applies to vessels which, although flying a foreign flag or
refusing to show a flag, are in reality vessels of the nationality of the
intercepting State.
• Vessels without a nationality. These may include unregistered vessels
whose national origins or connections are uncertain. Vessels sailing under two
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or more flags, displaying them according to convenience, may be assimilated to
vessels without a nationality.16 This reference to "convenience" is not to be
confused with the popular expression "flags of convenience," which refers to
vessels registered in countries having open registries or favorable or more
relaxed registration rules. These vessels do have the nationality of the State of
registration, notwithstanding that in some cases the control exercised by the
flag State is not as effective as it ought to be. 17
• Vessels engaged in piracy, the slave trade, or unauthorized broadcasting.
• Where the acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty,
either a bilateral treaty between the intercepting State and the flag State, or a
multilateral treaty. IS
There is a right for warships to verify (he flag in any of the cases above. But if
suspicions prove to be unfounded, and the intercepted vessel has not
committed any act justifying them, that vessel is entitled to compensation for
any resulting loss or damage. 19
The 1982 LOS Convention does not deal with the law of armed conflict.
Hence it must also be taken into account that acts of interception, boarding,
and arrest may take place on the high seas in the exercise of belligerent rights,
or in execution of decisions of the United Nations Security
in
Council.
Hot Pursuit. Intemationallaw allows for the hot pursuit of vessels in the high
seas, and arrest there, where an offense has been committed on the land
territory, internal waters, the territorial sea, or in the EEZ of the pursuing State.
Where the hot pursuit begins in the contiguous zone, it may be conducted only
in respect of violations of the rights for which that zone was established. The
position is the same in relation to pursuit beginning in the EEZ. Pursuit may
only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal has been given at a distance
which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship. The right of hot pursuit
terminates when the pursued vessel enters the territorial sea of its own or of a
third State. 20 There is no reason to terminate the pursuit merely because the
pursued vessel enters the EEZ of its own or of a third State.
Although the article on hot pursuit in the Convention appears only in Part
VII (the High Seas), it must be remembered that this Part applies also to the
EEZ, by reason of Article 58(2), insofar as its provisions are not incompatible
with the regime of the EEZ. Hence, a right of hot pursuit may begin in the
territorial sea or contiguous zone and end in the EEZ.
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According to customary international law the pursuit must be "hot and
continuous," that is, sight (which can include identification on radar) must not
be lost or interrupted.21 Where pursuit is begun by an aircraft, the Convention
provides that it must be continued until a warship or another aircraft can take
over the pursuit without interruption. It is not enough for the aircraft merely to
record a sighting; it must give a signal to the delinquent vessel to stop. The
position is taken in two Australian enactments that "the pursuit of a person or a
boat is not taken to be terminated or substantially interrupted only because the
officer or officers concerned lose sight [defined to include losing output from a
radar or other sensing device] of the person or boat.,,22 Although this position
may seem a generous interpretation of customary international law, it is
probably in accordance with modem realities.

Offenses against Marine Pollution Laws. The protection and preservation of
the marine environment were regarded as such important issues at UNCLOS III
that a separate Part of the Convention (part Xll) is devoted to the subject.
The essential scheme of the LOS Convention, relies on three enforcement
authorities in relation to pollution offenses: the flag State of the delinquent
vessel; the port State visited by the delinquent vessel after the offense; and the
coastal State whose laws have been violated. It is evident from the provisions of
Part Xll of the Convention that in the interests of freedom of navigation, these
alternatives are in descending order of preference: Articles 217, 218, and 220.
Under this scheme the flag State of the delinquent vessel always has
jurisdiction to prosecute its own vessel, wherever the offenses may have
occurred, and it must do so when violations of national laws adopted in
accordance with applicable rules and standards (principally the Conventions
sponsored by the International Maritime Organization) have occurred. The
port State's jurisdiction is mainly concerned with investigation and reporting
to the flag State, but it may institute proceedings itself at the request of the flag
State or of the coastal State affected. It may also institute proceedings if it is
affected in its capacity as a coastal State, where its own territorial waters or EEZ
have been polluted.
Coastal State powers over polluting foreign vessels are set out in Article 220.
This article is arranged in such a way as to require a higher threshold to be
crossed before enforcement action can be taken the farther from the coast the
offense is detected. If the delinquent vessel is voluntarily within a port of the
coastal State affected, proceedings may be brought in respect of pollution
offenses committed in the territorial sea or the EEZ of that State. If the vessel is
navigating in the territorial sea of the coastal State and there are "clear grounds
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for believing" that it has committed a pollution offense in the territorial sea, the
coastal State may apprehend and prosecute. If, however, the vessel is
navigating in the territorial sea or the EEZ and there are "clear grounds for
believing" that an offense was committed in the EEZ of the coastal State, that
State may not institute proceedings but may only require the vessel to give
information regarding its identity and its last and next ports of call (i.e., in order
to facilitate a prosecution by either the flag State or the port State). However,
in the last set of circumstances, if the violation in the EEZ has resulted in a
substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution of the marine
environment, the coastal State may undertake a physical inspection of the
vessel, but still not prosecute. But finally, if there is "clear objective evidence"
that a vessel in the situation of the last two cases has caused "major damage or
threat of damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State, or to
any of the resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone,"
then-and only then-may the coastal State prosecute in respect of pollution
offenses committed in its EEZ.
The flag State of the delinquent vessel may step in under Article 228 of the
Convention and assume jurisdiction itself where a coastal State has already
instituted proceedings in relation to pollution offenses in its EEZ, provided it
does so within six months. In that event the coastal State must suspend its own
proceedings, unless those proceedings "relate to a case of major damage to the
coastal State, or the flag State in question has repeatedly disregarded its
obligation to enforce effectively the applicable international rules and
standards in respect of violations committed by its vessels."
An exception to all of the above is the case of dumping. The term "dumping"
is not defined in Articles 210 and 216 of the LOS Convention except by way of
reference to the "international rules and standards established through
competent international organizations or diplomatic conference for the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment by
dumping." At present, the chief such international instrument is the London
Dumping Convention of 1972,23 which lists prohibited and restricted
substances in annexes. In the case of dumping (which is a deliberate and not a
negligent activity), the coastal State may enforce its laws in respect of offenses
committed in its territorial sea, its EEZ, or on its continental shelf,
notwithstanding that the flag State may also have instituted proceedings.
The implications of these purely conventional provisions (their status as
customary law has yet to be established) for freedom of navigation are obvious.
Confrontation between States might well take the form of a denial by one State
of navigation rights to the merchant ships, and especially oil tankers, of
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another on the pretext of pollution offenses. The provisions of the Convention
make such denial transparently unlawful, except in the case of a deliberate act
of dumping or a clearly established act of pollution of great magnitude.
The translation of the Convention rules into the national laws and
operational procedures of States must be closely watched in future. 24 Even in
the case of States whose laws automatically incorporate the terms of
international conventions, duly ratified, the terms of the articles discussed
above may be subject to varying interpretations.
The Use of Force Against Delinquent Vessels
The LOS Convention is markedly silent on the specification of the degrees
of force that may be used against vessels that refuse to stop when ordered to
bring to, or resist boarding, search, or arrest. All of the provisions of the
Convention that authorize or imply such police measures appear to assume
that the delinquent vessel will meekly submit to "enforcement measures" or
"necessary steps." There was a disinclination at UNCLOS III to discuss such
distasteful matters.
Guidance must therefore be sought in customary international law and from
general principles of law. The general international law rule, applicable to
self,defense and police,type measures alike, is that no more force may be used
than is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective and is
proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances. In respect of police'type
enforcement actions, evidence of State practice tends to be anecdotal and
variable, with some States resorting to the immediate use of weapons to compel
submission, while others are more patient in exhausting peaceful means.25
The scant arbitral decisions on the point support the latter approach. The
I'm Alone26 was an arbitration in 1933-1935 between Canada and the United
States concerning the sinking of a rum,runner and loss oflife on board. It had
failed to heave to after a lengthy chase and was fired into by a U.S. Coast Guard
cutter. The arbitration commissioners held that necessary and reasonable force
might be used for the purpose of boarding, searching, seizing, and bringing into
port a suspect vessel; if sinking should occur incidentally as a result of the
exercise of necessary and reasonable force, the pursuing vessel might be
blameless. But in this case, the admittedly intentional sinking of the suspect
vessel was not justified.
It is difficult to understand this decision in the light of the facts, which
included a hot pursuit lasting two days during which the I'm Alone tried to
outrun and outmaneuver its pursuer, except on the unstated basis that a
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deliberate sinking will in no circumstances (other than in self,defense where
violent resistance is employed or threatened) be warranted if the offense
involved is a customs (i.e., purely regulatory) offense.27 In other words, the
proportionality principle requires the enforcing State to weigh the gravity of
the offense against the value of human life. Rum,running (during the
Prohibition era of the United States, which had ended just before the
arbitration) did not strike the commissioners as sufficient to warrant such
drastic action. They did not have to consider other cases. It is suggested that
fisheries, revenue, immigration and other regulatory offenses would fall into
the same category. So might pollution offenses. This is not only because
sending a vessel with dangerous cargoes or wastes on board to the bottom
might only compound the danger, but because of the Convention scheme,
outlined above, under which the flag State can be required to take
enforcement action against a delinquent vessel escaping immediate arrest.
Other cases might justify the use of more vigorous, and perhaps ultimately
deadly, force, such as piratical vessels, vessels carrying arms to dissidents in the
enforcing State, or craft carrying large quantities of narcotic drugs. These cases
might be argued to have the character of self,defense or self, preservation more
than of enforcement of regulatory laws.
The Red Crusader28 was also a case involving a regulatory offense, unlawful
fishing. It was an arbitration between Denmark and the United Kingdom. In
that case, a boarding party from the Danish fisheries patrol vessel had been
overpowered and locked up by the crew of an arrested Scottish trawler. The
trawler then turned and made a run for home waters. A lengthy chase ensued
in which the Danish vessel fired repeated warning shots. Finally shots were
fired at the bridge and into the hull of the trawler, despite which the trawler
succeeded in escaping. The United Kingdom claimed that the force used had
been excessive. The arbitral tribunal agreed, finding that the force used was
"without proved necessity." It held that "other means should have been
attempted, which, if duly persisted in, might have finally persuaded Skipper
\Vood to stop and revert to normal procedures."
The lesson of these arbitral cases is that force endangering human life is not
justified, at least where purely regulatory offenses are concerned.29 A premium
is thus placed on the skill and equipment of enforcement vessels. Those vessels
must have adequate visual and auditory signaling capacity, and speed,
seakeeping capability, and maneuverability adequate to their task. In all cases,
warning shots are to be used before fire is directed at unmanned parts of the
pursued vessel. Even warning shots should not be used without first resorting to
other methods of ordering the vessel to stop.30 Methods other than gunfire are
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to be used wherever possible, where the pursued vessel refuses to stop, e.g., by
outmaneuvering,
water hoses to short out electrical systems,
communications
harpooned lines to foul the screws, etc. Instant
are also important in supplementing, where necessary, rules of engagement,
and for receiving specific instructions from the responsible authorities.31
The sole reference in the LOS Convention to the degree of force to be used
in enforcement measures appears in Article 225, which states: "In the exercise
under this Convention of their powers of enforcement against foreign vessels,
States shall not endanger the safety of navigation or otherwise create any
hazard to a vessel, or bring it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or expose the
marine environment to an unreasonable risk."
In the light of what has been said, it may be wondered what "endangering
safety" would be if the pursued vessel deliberately evaded a legitimate approach
by an investigating or enforcing State vessel. The only sensible construction of
Article 225 is to read it subject to the general international law principles of
necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness, and not as a blanket prohibition
against the use of any degree of force in any circumstances.
The case of offending civil aircraft raises a special consideration of what is
necessary, proportionate, and reasonable. Aircraft in flight cannot be
"stopped" in the way that surface vessels can be; also, they are extremely
vulnerable to the exercise of the slightest degree of force. They may be
intercepted and ordered to land at a designated airport, but they may not be
fired on. Following the incident of the shooting down of a Korean Airlines
passenger aircraft over Soviet territory in 1983, a Protocol relating to an
Amendment to the Convention on Civil Aviation was adopted at Montreal in
1984.32 Article 3 bis was added to the Convention in the following terms:
The contracting states recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to
the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception,
the lives of persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must not be
endangered. This provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any manner
the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations.

This provision clearly reserves the right of
against armed attack
33
under the UN Charter and customary internationallaw.
The possibility exists that there may emerge an international jurisprudence
on the subject of law enforcement activities at sea. Part )0/ of the LOS
Convention provides for the settlement of disputes arising under the
Convention. It is a complex scheme, combining compulsory elements with a
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number of limitations and optional exceptions. States may declare that they
accept the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the
International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance
with Annex VII of the Convention, or a special arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes
specified therein.34
The provisions of Part XV, Section 3, which contain the limitations and
exceptions to the applicability of compulsory procedures entailing binding
decisions, almost defy a reading that would make clear what is included in the
obligation to submit to compulsory dispute settlement procedures as distinct
from what is not.35 Disputes concerning law enforcement activities are listed
among the optional exceptions to compulsory dispute settlement, but only "in
regard to the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction excluded from the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3."36 Those
two paragraphs refer to marine scientific research and fisheries, respectively,
but only so far as to exclude compulsory jurisdiction in respect of the exercise of
coastal State discretions under·the Convention. If a coastal State sought to
. impede navigation or overflight through the assertion of rights not granted by
the
there would be jurisdiction over the. assertiqn, as well as over
the manner of its exercise. Expressly included in the compulsory dispute
settlement procedures are cases:
.
a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of the
provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of navigation,
overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in regard to other
internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article 58; ...
(c) wnen it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified
international rules and standards for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment which are applicable to the coastal State and which have
been established by this Convention or through a competent international
organization or diplomatic conference in accordance with this Convention.37

Thus a balance is struck in Part XV, as in Part V of the Convention in relation
to the EEZ itself, between the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal States
and the interests of the international community in freedom of navigation.
The above provisions are directed to cases arising in the EEl, since Article
297 (1) refers to "the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or
jurisdiction provided for in the Convention." The expression "sovereign rights
or jurisdiction" is a term of art in the Convention and refers only to the EEl and
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continental shelf. It seems anomalous, but the provisions of Part XV limiting
and excepting obligations to submit to binding dispute settlement procedures
appear to leave entirely open disputes concerning the exercise of powers in the
territorial sea and archipelagic waters, since in these areas the coastal State has
sovereignty. Thus the enforcement of coastal State laws in territorial seas and
archipelagic waters, including in relation to straits transit passage and
archipelagic sea lanes passage, might be made the subject of compulsory
reference to judicial or arbitral procedures.38
Restraints on the Use of Force Imposed by Domestic Law
In proceedings for the enforcement of the various national laws applying in
the maritime zones of the coastal State, the issue of the use of force may be
raised. Damages in separate civil proceedings may be sought by an
apprehended person or shipowner in relation to the use of excessive force,
although this right may be limited by law.39
Under the common law, the act of State doctrine may be raised as a defense
by a naval or other government officer against an action brought by a foreign
citizen in the enforcing State's courts in respect of a tortious act committed
against that person or a foreign vessel on the high seas or in a foreign place in
the execution of duty.40 If the tortious act (e.g., an excessively forceful arrest of
a foreign fishing boat) occurs in territorial waters, however, the act of State
doctrine will not apply. Territorial waters will be regarded as equivalent to
territory for the purposes of the doctrineY Will the contiguous zone and the
exclusive economic zone be excluded also from the application of the act of
State doctrine? There is no direct authority, but it is arguable that in the
exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction within an area conceded by
international law to the coastal State, and conducted pursuant to national laws
which give effect to those rights and jurisdictions, that area should be treated as
national territory for purposes of the act of State doctrine. Indirect support for
this view is found in the United Kingdom Sea Fisheries Act of 1968,42 which
protects an officer from civil or criminal proceedings in execution of the Act in
areas of proclaimed fishery limits.
It does not appear to be common practice, at least in countries of the
common law, to provide for a statutory code of enforcement practices in
relation to law enforcement at sea. Instead, law enforcement officers charged
with maritime duties are guided by the common law and by any general statute
governing the use of force in apprehending offenders.
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The common law on the use of force in effecting an arrest can be taken from
the following passage from the Criminal Code Bill Commission Report of the
British Parliament (1879):43
\Y.Je take one great principle of the common law to be, that though it sanctions
the defence of a man's person, liberty and property against illegal violence, and
permits the use of force to prevent crimes, to preserve the public peace, and to
bring offenders to justice, yet all this is subject to the restriction that the force
used is necessary; that is, that the mischief sought to be prevented could not be
prevented by less violent means; and that the mischief done by, or which might
reasonably be anticipated from the force used is not disproportioned [sic] to the
injury or mischief which it is intended to prevent.

The common law also distinguishes between the powers of arrest possessed by
any person and the powers of arrest of constables.
These principles are reflected in legislation of Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom with respect to the exercise of the power of arrest, legislation
which is regarded in all three countries as extending to enforcement action
under statutes applying in the various national maritime zones. However, there
are differences in the legislation.
The Australian Crimes Act of 1914, section 3ZC, provides that "a person
must not, in the course of arresting another person for an offence, use more
force, or subject another person to greater indignity, than is necessary and
reasonable to make the arrest or to prevent the escape of the other person after
the arrest." For the purposes of customs, environmental, fisheries, and
immigration laws, officials of the relevant departments, and naval officers, are
merely "persons" within the meaning of this provision, subject to any other
statutory powers they may have. The use of deadly force seems only to be
envisaged at the hands of a constable:
(2) Without limiting the operation of subsection (1), a constable must not, in the
course of arresting a person for an offence:
(a) do anything that is likely to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm
to, the person unless the constable believes on reasonable grounds that
doing that thing is necessary to protect the life or to prevent serious injury
to another person (including the constable); or

(b) if the person is attempting to escape arrest by fleeing - do such a thing
unless:
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(i) the constable believes on reasonable grounds that doing that
thing is necessary to protect life or to prevent serious injury to
another person (including the constable); and
(ii) the person has, if practicable, been called upon to surrender and
the constable believes on reasonable grounds that the person cannot
be apprehended in any other manner..

It must be assumed to be deliberate that officers engaged in maritime law
enforcement have not been given the express power possessed by constables to
use deadly force in self,defense or for the protection of others. The question
poses itself: why not? It could hardly be that private persons do not have a right
of self,defensej the criminal law allows this. The reason presumably must be
that in a code dealing with powers of arrest, private persons are not to be
encouraged to get so close to offenders that the question arises. If this is so, the
absence of constabulary powers in maritime law enforcement officers is
unjustifiable.
Sections 25, 26, and 27 of the Canadian Criminal Code govern the use of
force in effecting an arrest and are regarded as applying also to the enforcement
of fisheries laws.44 Under Section 25 (3), the power possessed by any person to
arrest another person, unlike under Australian law, does extend to "using force
that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm [if] he
believes on reasonable and probable grounds that it is necessary for the purpose
of preserving himself or anyone under his protection from death or grievous
bodily harm." Thus the defect under Australian law does not exist in Canada.
Moreover, the powers given under the Code to "peace officers"-the statutory
equivalent of a common law constable-are extended to members of the
Canadian Forces by virtue of the definition of "peace officer" in the Code.45
This results in their having powers which, if exercised at sea, especially in the
EEZ, might engage Canada in responsibility under international law for using
excessive force. The following section of the Code would, at all events, seem to
conflict with the arbitral decisions in the Red Crusader and I'm Alone cases,
discussed above:

25 (4). A peace officer who is proceeding lawfully to arrrest, with or without
warrant, any person for an offence for which that person may be arrested without
warrant, and every one lawfully assisting the peace officer, is justified, if the
person to be arrested takes flight to avoid arrest, in using as much force as is
necessary to prevent escape by flight, unless the escape can be prevented by
reasonable means in a less violent manner.
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Fenrick comments that Section 25 (4) gives "a somewhat distorted picture of
the current state of Canadian law." It has not been relied on in any reported
cases of law enforcement at sea. He submits that "notwithstanding the wording
of section 25(4) ... HMC ships should not use force which is intended or is
likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm for the purpose of enforcing
fisheries legislation, unless such force is necessary for the defence ofHMC ships
or for the defence of some other person or vessel under her protection.,,46 In
other words, he submits that international law should be followed in preference
to the literal wording of the legislation.
Exceptionally, national law may itself provide for a special regime of law
enforcement applying under a particular enactment. This is the case of the
peculiar-one might say flagrant-provision of Australian and Canadian
customs legislation inherited from a British model.
The Australian Customs Act of1901, Section 184, headed "Power to pursue
ships and aircraft", provides:
(1) Where the master of a ship refuses or fails to comply with a request ... to
permit the ship to be boarded, the person in command of any ship in the service
of the Commonwealth ... or any aircraft in the service of the Commmonwealth
... may use his ship or aircraft to chase, and, after firing a gun as a signal, fire at or
into the first-mentioned ship in order to compel it to be brought to for boarding.

The equivalent Canadian legislation, the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, chapter
CAO, section 141(5), is in essentially the same terms.
Their common ancestor is the British Smuggling Act of 1833,47 which
consolidated various enactments going back to the early eighteenth century.
The provision is retained, but in watered-down language-"may be fired
upon"-in current United Kingdom legislation.48
All three enactments are open to serious objection as being contrary to
contemporary international law. The Australian legislation is even worse, as it
also permits the same procedure to be applied to offending aircraft.49
The case of the MN Saiga, before the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, reveals that some other States extend quite draconian domestic
legislation, normally applicable to land territory, against foreign vessels at sea.
In that case, a vessel registered in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was
arrested in the exclusive economic zone of Guinea for alleged customs offenses.
Force was used, and two members of the crew of the arrested vessel were
wounded. The Penal Code of Guinea was cited in argument; it provides that
"no crime or offense is committed in the case of a killing or wounding
committed by the forces of order against offenders who as a flagrant offense
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smuggle at the border and have not complied with the usual demands.,,50 It was
not necessary for the Tribunal, in the circumstances of the case, to judge the
compatibility of this provision with international law.
The Enforcement of Domestic Laws in National Maritime Zones Against
Citizens and Flag Vessels by Navies of the Enforcing State
Navies are often used in law enforcement roles in national maritime zones.
In the case of States which do not have a separate coast guard, fisheries
protection, or other similar non-naval service, it may be the only enforcement
agency, or at least enforcement platform, available.51 The advantage of using
navies is great when States with large maritime areas to protect are faced with
incursions by technologically advanced and fast, distant-water fishing fleets.52
There is also an economy of scale and effort, where navies on training exercises
may be diverted to law enforcement activities as required.
The disadvantages of using navies in a law enforcement role are chiefly two.
Most obviously, navies are not primarily intended for law enforcement but for
national defense. Undue diversion from their primary role is seen as
undesirable. Second, the powers of naval officers to arrest persons are, at least
in the case of the common-law countries, no greater than those of an ordinary
citizen. Any additional powers required must be granted by statute. In this
connection, there is the additional consideration, again at least in the case of
the common-law countries, of the traditional reluctance to use the armed
forces in the enforcement oflaws against citizens.
In the United States, the Posse Comitatus Act forbids the use of the U.S.
Army or Air Force to enforce domestic laws. This prohibition is extended, as
a matter of policy, to the Navy and the Marine Corps.53 The United States
Coast Guard exists for the enforcement of laws against both citizens and
aliens. Statutory exceptions to the prohibition of the use of the Navy are
allowed, and they have been made in the case of the counterdrug war.54
However, the Navy provides only the platform and the equipment; search,
seizure, and arrest are carried out by Coast Guard personnel embarked. The
prohibition is not as strict in Australia55 or Canada.56 Although naval officers
have been invested with statutory powers of arrest under various statutes
concerned with the enforcement of laws at sea, there is a reluctance to use
these unless necessary, especially against citizens.57 Normally civilian officials
holding powers under such legislation as that governing customs and fisheries
are carried aboard.
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Into the Next Millenium
The modern international law of the sea is as unavoidable a feature of the
arena in which armed conflict may be threatened, or actually conducted, as the
limitations of the weapons platforms deployed and the state of the weather.
Certain additional rights and duties arise under the law of armed conflict not
applicable under the law of the sea in times of peace; but a knowledge of the law
of the sea, and its inculcation in regular exercises, is an essential part of naval
and air force training.
The enforcement of national laws at sea, in exercise of the rights to regulate
the extensive maritime zones recognized by the LOS Convention and under
customary international law, necessarily involves a projection of sovereignty or
of national jurisdiction with a high potential to conflict with the rights and
interests of other States. Disputes may arise concerning innocent passage
through the territorial sea, straits transit, and archipelagic sea lanes passage
and overflight, and the enforcement in the EEZ oflaws not clearly warranted by
the 1982 Convention or by international rules and standards laid down by
competent international organizations or under international conventions
adopted by diplomatic conferences consistent with the Convention. Disputed
claims to sovereign rights or jurisdiction may lead to confrontation and the
danger of eventual armed conflict. The international law of the sea will be
invoked by one or both sides in justification of its position. The national law
enforcement agencies, whether navies, coast guards, or other forces, acting in
accordance with national laws and policies that mayor may not be in
accordance with international law, are the instruments by which that law may
be violated or vindicated. The potential for mistakes or miscalculations can
hardly be overstated.
The principle of graduated force 58 underlies the measures that should be
of the threat of violence and the
employed in order to achieve a
peaceful resolution of disputes. It is vital that all maritime law enforcement
agencies understand this principle and do not engage in actions that are
needlessly provocative or escalatory. There is consequently a need for close
coordination of all agencies, with joint training in common doctrine, and the
observance of integrated rules of engagement in maritime law enforcement
roles. Since navies, whether they are directly involved in law enforcement or
not, have the ultimate responsibility of defending the nation against armed
attack, it is logical that they should assume the primary responsibility for the
development of doctrine and the coordination of enforcement procedures.
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It is evident that some States engage in more forceful measures in the
purported exercise of their sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction than is
justified by international law. A developed international jurisprudence has not
yet emerged. The reluctance of States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of
international courts and tribunals over questions of the manner of their
exercise of enforcement powers has been noted. The obligation to submit
disputes to settlement procedures under the LOS Convention, albeit affected
by limitations and exceptions, has only existed for the parties to the
Convention since its entry into force in 1994. The potential for those courts
and tribunals to develop principles and rules in relation to maritime law
enforcement may be realized in the early part of the twenty,first century.
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